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Summary findings
Recent developments in emerging financial markets have  medium to longer term. Declines in real economic
dramatically changed the appetite for (and terms of)  activity make matters especially difficult for toll roads, as
transport infrastructure projects. As a result of defaults in  drivers shift to free alternatives and reduce the number
Asia and Russia and devaluations in Asia, Brazil, and  of trips taken.
Russia, political and currency and exchange risk premia  What does all this mean for project finance in
have increased dramatically. Given large needs for  transport?  Risks have increased. Debt finance costs more.
sovereign debt financing, infrastructure project finance  The available tenor of debt instruments has shortened
will be seeking guarantees at the same time as  and more equity is required for projects. The sources and
governments are issuing primary securities. Large  availability of equity finance have changed. Project
portfolio  outflows in emerging market funds mean that  finance efforts have shifted from new projects to the
the sources of both equity and debt capital that became  privatization, rehabilitation, and expansion of existing
available in the mid-1990s are drying up for all but the  facilities. And a "superclass" of sponsors, bankers, and
most creditworthy  projects.  investors has emerged.
Moreover, real economic effects from financial events  Failures and mistakes in project finance deals in the
have consequences in the transport sector, since  1990s were sharp and persistent. But much has been
transport is a derived demand. Any decline in real  learned about sound project economics, conservative
economic activity is felt quickly in traffic levels and  financial structures, comprehensive sensitivity analysis,
revenues. Currency devaluations that help spur exports  the effects of macroeconomic factors, and the need for
may generate higher volumes for seaports and air cargo  proper incentives and sound institutional and regulatory
activity. These effects vary by sector, especially over the  arrangements.
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Introduction
The financial crises in emerging markets in the 1990s dramatically  changed the market
for transport infrastructure finance. The run of good economic and financial performance,
whether actual or illusory, had spurred a boom in project finance activity. As one observer
noted  in  November  1996  (just before  the  Asian  crises  occurred),  "...there  is  a  growing
acceptance of investing in (developing) countries because they have done very positive things
to make themselves more attractive...  another theory is that there's fundamentally too much
money out there, and the money is chasing around after deals and some people are fooling
themselves."' As new sources of money, from pension assets to emerging bond markets to new
types  of  bank  debt, became available, many infrastructure projects were  able to  obtain
financing.
This boom period led to two basic problems. First, forecasts of revenues, traffic, and
economic activity became more and more optimistic, so that "best  case"  scenarios often
became "base case" scenarios, and little attention was paid to "worst case" scenarios. Second,
this lack of attention to project evaluation led to a willingness to use ever-larger amounts of
debt in project capital structures. Even high-risk projects faced heavy debt servicing burdens.
Long-term  projects were undertaken  using short-term  debt, buoyed by confidence  that when the
debt matured, it would simply be "rolled over" on equivalent (or better) terms. Floating-rate
debt was common, further increasing interest rate risk. Projects that generated local currency
revenues were increasingly  being financed in international  markets, as lenders and borrowers
grew confident  that exchange  rates would remain the same, so that currency risk was minor.
At the same time, new types of financial instruments were developed and being used
without a clear understanding of the risks they imposed, especially on behalf of governments.
As an example, the growth of securitization (the pooling of project finance securities) was
interpreted by some government officials as a means of avoiding sound economic and credit
analysis of projects. 2 This new type of transaction was sometimes interpreted as a means to
pass along poor projects: "After all, even if this one project was pretty risky, it would just
become one part of a larger portfolio-and  so there was no need  to worry."
This project finance environment  came to a crashing  halt in 1997, and was worsened by
conditions in emerging markets in 1998 and 1999. Again, there were two main results. First,
many of the projects that had been undertaken in the previous few years failed. They fell victim
to everything ranging from optimistic forecasts to too much debt to an inability to refinance
bridge  loans.  Many  projects  were  hit  with  a  cascade  of  problems  because  currency
depreciations led to high inflation and economic contractions that sharply reduced revenues.
Project revenues were further reduced through price effects of contractually mandated toll
increases (due to inflation).  The same inflation  resulted in higher financing costs, in some cases
doubling debt service burdens within weeks. Currency depreciations  made it almost impossible
for many projects  to generate  enough foreign exchange to meet international  debt payments.  To
' John Wand, Managing Director of Project Finance  at Prudential Capital, quoted in G. Millman, "Negotiating  the
Project  Finance  Labyrinth,"  Infrastructure  Finance, November 1996,  p. 15.
2 For a more complete discussion  of securitization  as applied to project finance,  see J. P. Forrester,  J. H. P. Kravitt,
and R. M. Rosenberg, "Securitization  of Project Finance Loans and Other Private Sector Infrastructure Loans,"
The Financier, Vol. I No. 1, (February 1994),  pp. 7-19.2
paraphrase an old advertising campaign,  for transport  project finance in developing countries it
was a time of "when it rains, it pours."
The results were dramatic. Foreign investment  flows to emerging markets in 1999 were
less than half of what they had been five years earlier. A whole range of projects, from toll
roads to ports to airports, either went bankrupt, had to be renegotiated, or were taken over by
the respective governments. As available financing dried up, projects that had been in the
proposal or development stages were unable to come to market and close. Regulators and
governments worldwide found they had to develop new skills in contract renegotiations and
workouts. Many countries are still struggling  with the financial consequences of failed project
finance structures.
Many of the long-established  features  of project finance have come under attack or have
been modified so that  old definitions and approaches have given way to  new  roles for
governments and development institutions. At the same time, the private sector has had to
adjust to new demands from investors in terms of financial  structures, required returns, and risk
allocation and mitigation. This chapter provides a primer on this new world of project finance
for government officials and transport  regulators.
The Rise of Private Participation  in Transport
The rise of project finance in transport has its roots in broader privatization initiatives.
Worldwide,  recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the involvement  of the private sector
in the development and funding of public facilities and services in transport, ranging from
management  contracts  for  existing  operations to  full  greenfield development  of  new
infrastructure. 3
The development  of such private participation  in transport operations and infrastructure
is attributable  to a number of factors. First, national governments  have increasingly found that
they  do  not  have  the  financial resources to  upgrade, maintain,  and  expand transport
infrastructure  consistent with economic growth and development goals. Additionally, private
participation is seen as a means to bring infrastructure  projects and technological efficiencies
that may be difficult to match in the public sector. A government can facilitate the project
through the provision of assets, such as land and licenses,  and possibly through the provision of
subsidies,  guarantees, or other support.
There are many forms of private participation  in transport, including:
*  The  contracting  out  of  services,  where  the  private  sector  is  contracted  to  provide
services  on  behalf  of the  government  for  compensation,  either  in terms  of a  share of
revenue, profit, or payments form the government. In general, contracting out does not
involve financing risk, although it may involve  revenue risk.
e  Joint ventures,  in which the public and private sectors share responsibility  for financing
and operation of public facilities;
3  See  J.  A. Gomez-Ibanez and  J.  R.  Meyer, Going  Private: The International  Experience  with Transport
Privatization,  (Washington:  Brookings,  1993);  A.  Estache,  "Privatization  and  Regulation  of  Transport
Infrastructure in the  1990s," World Bank Policy Research Paper 2248, (Washington: World Bank, November
1999).3
*  Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) projects, where the private sector has the primary
responsibility for financing,  developing, and operating the facility for a fixed period of
time, which should be sufficient to both repay debt and provide the required return on
investment.  At the end of the concession,  assets are transferred  to the government under
terms agreed to in the contract. Perhaps the most familiar form of participation in
transport infrastructure,  this has been employed  in many different variations. 4
*  Build, Own, and Operate (BOO), where the private sector obtains the ownership and
control of the facilities, with no transfer  to the public sector.
Within these broad categories is  a  continuum of  organizational forms for private
participation in which the risk level taken on by the private sector increases until it gets fully
assumed. Project finance and regulatory issues arise genreally from the organizational forms
organized around concessions, franchises, and variations of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)
projects with or without concessions.
What is Project Finance?
Project finance has typically been used in those  sectors that require large capital
expenditures,  that have long-lived assets, and that require long periods to amortize investment
costs and generate required rates of return for both creditors and equity holders. Historically,
project finance has been used to describe financings  in which the lenders look to the cash flows
of an investment  project for repayment,  without recourse  to either equity sponsors or the public
sector to make up any shortfall.
In its simplest terms, project finance usually has the following features which are build
around the contractual commitments  to each other:
*  A special purpose vehicle is created to undertake the project; the idea is to isolate as
much as possible the project from other activities in which the various players may be
involved to force the transparency of the financing commitments made to the project;
),More specially, the project itself is treated as a separate entity from the sponsors, and
this entity borrows funds solely based on the project's cash flows and the equity in the
entity  itself.. This independence allows the project to be separated from the equity
investors' balance sheet; therefore it is frequently referred to as "off-balance sheet
financing".
*  Bank debt is expected to be the primary debt funding source but this depends to an
increasing  extent  on  the  nature  of  the  project  and  the  overall  macroeconomic
environment;
*  Sponsor equity is committed,  and sometimes  paid up-front, prior to the provision  of any
debt finance but the way this is paid can vary significantly across project types; where
construction companies are potentially significant  players,  they will bring equity in cash
and in kind since they are interested  in amortizing  their equipment  in the context of the
4  These  include Build-Own-Operate-Transfer  (BOOT), Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT), Build-Transfer-Operate
(BTO), Design-Build-Finance-Operate  (DBFO), and Design-Construct-Manage-Finance  (DCMF).
S Summarized  and adapted from Macquarie Corporate Finance Ltd., Project Finance: The Guide to Financing
Transport  Projects,  Euromoney  Publications,  1996,  p. 5.4
project; The sponsor usually tries to structure the project so that the gross assets and
liabilities of the project are kept off the sponsor's balance sheet.
*  The project's cash flow is the principal basis for returns for both  debt and equity
investors... and for the payments to the government of a canon when this is one of the
conditions of the award of the service to a private operator;  the project's assets are the
principal collateral for any borrowings;
*  Payments to  equity  holders  are  subordinate to  operating  costs  and  debt  service
obligations.. .very often including payments to the government  which has proven to be a
source of problem in Latin America;
*  Once the project is operational, lenders have no or very limited recourse to the credit of
the project's owners (either sponsor equity or government in the case of BOT projects);
In general, a private sector entity (referred to as the "concessionaire") is granted a
concession by a  governmental entity to design, build, and/or operate transport services or
infrastructure for a specified period. The concessionaire  typically is responsible for raising the
finances required to carry out the project. At the end of the concession  period, the facilities and
their operation may be transferred to the host government, depending on the nature of the
contract. The concessionaire will typically take care of forming the Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV).
However, the difficulties encountered in emerging markets in the 1990s and the well-
publicized problems experienced by some transport  infrastructure  projects have forced both the
private and public sectors to expand the idea of project financing. While the ultimate goal may
be to arrange project borrowings which will provide a minimally expected rate of return to
sponsor equity and at the same time be completely not demanding for the sponsor or the
government, such a  goal has proven  almost impossible to  accomplish, except  in  a  few
extraordinary situations.
This gap between goals and reality has led to  a popular misconception that project
finance means off-balance sheet financing to the point that the project is completely self-
supporting  without guarantees or  other support  from  financially responsible parties.  As
described by Nevitt and Fabozzi, "The key to a successful project financing is structuring the
financing of a project with as little recourse as possible to the sponsor while at the same time
providing  sufficient  credit  support  through  guarantees  or  undertakings  of  a  sponsor
(government), or third party, so that lenders  will be satisfied with the credit risk." 6
The Advantages of Project Finance
The advantages of project finance depend on your position and viewpoint. Promoters of
project finance (sponsors and investment  bankers) prefer project finance because it has allowed
them to undertake projects without exhausting their ability to borrow for traditional projects,
and without increasing debt ratios (or at least those that are calculated based on reported
financial statements). Project finance structures can be  used by  companies to  limit their
financial risk to a project to the amount of their equity investment. 7 In addition, if the project
6 p. K. Nevitt and F. Fabozzi, Project  Financing, Sixth  ed.,  Euromoney  Publications,  1995,  p. 3.
7 The non-recourse nature of the debt in a project financing  may change during the life of the project. For example,
debt may be structured to provide recourse to the project sponsor only during the construction and commissioning
phases.5
itself has particularly strong and secure cash flows, project finance may allow more debt to be
employed in the financing mix, since creditors do not have to worry about project cash flows
being siphoned  off for other  corporate uses.
Project finance may provide stronger incentives  for careful project evaluation and risk
assessment. Since the project's cash flows are key to obtaining financing, such projects should
undergo careful technical and economic review and sensitivity analysis. This may lead to
clarification of the nature and magnitude of project risks and what causes them. Having an
detailed, objective assessment of project risks and potential may not only enable risks to be
allocated to the appropriate parties, but in some cases, the project analysis itself may reveal
ways to change the project to reduce the overall level of risks or to improve their allocation. For
example, demand analysis of a toll road may show opportunities to  delay expansion until
certain traffic levels trigger new investments  in capacity.
The Disadvantages  of Project Finance
Project finance transactions are more complex than traditional corporate or public
financing,  typically involving many  more  parties  and  resulting in  significantly higher
transaction  costs. The complexity  of project finance deals also makes them very expensive.  The
due diligence  process conducted  by lenders,  legal counsel,  and other technical experts results in
higher development  costs, with higher fees and interest margins  than what is typically charged.
It is not unusual for the total cost of a project finance transaction to cost twice as much as
straight debt or equity finance. Total costs may reach 7 to  10 percent of total project value.
When acting as a financial advisor to a project, investment  banks will typically charge fees of
$20,000 to $30,000 per month, plus all expenses. They also typically receive a success fee if
the project reaches financial  closure, which can range from .0025  to 1.0 percent of total project
value.
Negotiations on various aspects of the project are usually protracted and may be quite
contentious. This  is  especially true for  transport projects, which typically are politically
sensitive,  have high visibility, and retain strong public interest and participation.  Getting parties
with diverse interests to agree on the nature and magnitude of risks is very hard, let alone
getting them to  agree on who should bear these risks. The documentation associated with
project financing is almost always complex  and lengthy.
Even after  the financing is  closed, the project  will usually be  subject to  closer
monitoring  by all parties. Because lenders  primarily rely on revenue flows to repay their loans,
the degree of lender supervision of the management and operation of the project will most
likely be greater than for an ordinary corporate  loan. Likewise,  public officials need an ongoing
program to monitor contract compliance and potential exposure to any guarantees that have
been provided, as well as regulatory  oversight  when deemed necessary.
Risk Identification,  Analysis and Management 8
The identification  and management  of risks is essential in any project financing because
of the non-recourse or  limited recourse nature of project debt and the limited contractual
" This  section  is drawn  from  P. K. Nevitt  and  F. Fabozzi,  Project  Financing,  Sixth  ed., Euromoney  Publications,
1995, chapter  2;  Wilde  Sapte, Project Finance: the  Guide to  Financing Build-Operate-Transfer  Projects,
Euromoney Publications, 1997, chapter 1; Macquarie Corporate Finance Ltd., Project Finance: The Guide to
Financing Transport  Projects, Euromoney  Publications,  1996.6
undertakings of the project owner. Since each project faces a different set of risks, it is always
best to try to identify them at the outset and allocate them to the appropriate parties. This is
why one of the first tasks that public officials should  address is to understand  the distribution of
risks to which each party is committed. In many renegotiations or regulatory disputes, the
ultimate responsibility and resolution will be  based on the assignments spelled out  in the
contract.
The potential varies for a risk to actually occur. One study showed  that 82 percent of all
projects  experienced some  material  problem  after  financial  close. 9 Even  if  the  actual
percentages are not that high, almost every major transport  project in recent years has involved
some degree of restructuring and renegotiation.
One of the long-standing tenets of project finance has been that the project participant
who controls or is best able to manage the risks should bear them. While true in principle,
reality often fails to live up to the goal. Risk allocation is complex and difficult, and for all
practical purposes it is a negotiated process. For example, governments are responsible for
changes in the law, yet the risk and consequences of such changes are often shifted to the
private sector. Or, the central bank may have the greatest responsibility for inflation and
interest rate outcomes, yet in reality it is often the project developers, creditors, and equity
providers who end up bearing the interest rate risk. There are numerous other risks that do not
necessarily end up being borne by the party best able to manage it. More often, it is the best and
most experienced  negotiator  that ends up bearing the least amount of risk.
Also, the level and type of risk encountered  may change over time. The 1998 Asian
crisis increased perceived risk levels enough to increase the required rate of return to levels
unachievable for most projects. On the other hand, governments  may fall prey to a "fear-greed
cycle", in which governments become afraid of program failure and thus offer increasingly
better terms. Alternatively, prospective concessionaires  who worry that they will get left out
bid unrealistically. Subsequently,  the element of greed takes over in which governments may
fail to live up to commitments and the private sector seeks ways to privatize gains and socialize
the project's risks.
Successful  projects have been characterized  by a broad level of risk-sharing between the
public and private sectors. Generally, the private sector is better at managing commercial  risks
and responsibilities such as those associated with construction, operation, and financing. In
contrast, transport projects most  likely depend on public  participation in  areas  such as
acquisition of right-of-way,  political risk, and in some cases, traffic and revenue risk. Project
finance has worked best when experienced,  well-capitalized  firms have enough discretion over
design and confidence in toll policy to accept construction and some degree of traffic risk,
while the government assumes the risks that it controls and gives consideration to financial
support or guarantees  if traffic levels in the early years are insufficient.
We next turn to an analysis of the principal risks in transport project finance. When
making such an assessment, it may be useful to generate  a comprehensive  risk matrix that lays
out the main risks, their perceived likelihood, and how they are to be managed. One such
example of a risk matrix is shown in Table 1.
9 S. Hoffman, "A Practical Guide to Transactional Project Finance: Basic Concepts, Risk  Identification, and
Contractual  Considerations,"  The Business  Lawyer, Vol. 45, November 1989,  pp. 181-232.7
Construction  Phase Risks
During this phase, the major risks are delays in completion and the commencement  of
project  cash  flows;  cost  overruns with  an  increase in  the  capital  needed to  complete
construction;  and the insolvency  or lack of experience  of contractors  or key suppliers.
Construction costs may  exceed estimates for  many reasons, including  inaccurate
engineering and design, escalation in material and labor costs, and delays in project start-up.
Cost  overruns typically are handled through a  fixed-price and  fixed-terrn contract, with
incentives for completion and for meeting pre-specified investment goals. Other alternatives
include provision for additional equity infusions by the sponsor or standby agreements for
additional debt financing. It  is  always sensible for developers to  establish an  escrow or
contingency  fund to cover such overruns.
Delays in project completion can result in an increase in total costs through higher
capitalized interest charges. It also may affect the scheduled  flow of project revenues necessary
for debt service costs and operating  and maintenance  expenses.
Availability  of Materials  and Equipment
In many developing countries, the risk of equipment or materials for construction or
operation must be considered. This is especially true with respect to rolling stock or in for
specialized equipment, like gantry cranes or loading bridges used in ports or airports. Transit
bottlenecks, tariffs, foreign currency fluctuations and other factors can cause a  significant
increase  in costs.
Contractor  capability
The main contractors and key subcontractors  should have the experience, reputation,
financial, technical, and human resources to be capable of completing the project in timely
fashion on budget. This risk is best addressed through tough pre-qualification of bidders (if
sponsors are also contractors); through certification and monitoring if unrelated parties are
used; and by ongoing financial oversight of the contracting companies themselves, to make
sure that poor results form other projects or from weak balance sheets do not spill over into the
specific project of interest.8
Table 1: Hypothetical  Summary Risk Allocation  Table for Transport  Project Finance
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activity over which the project developer has no control. In these cases, agreement on some
form of cost ceiling may be necessary  in the concession  contract.
In some cases, a special govermnent  body may be charged with implementing  the land
acquisition process. Generally, the host government should ensure that required licenses and
permits be obtainable without  unreasonable  delay or expense.
Start-Up and Operating Phase Risks
The major risks for transport projects in these stages relate to  traffic/revenue risk;
regulatory and legal changes; interest rate and foreign exchange risks; force majeure risk; and
political risk.
Technology  Risks
Project finance participants cannot ignore new  technologies since they can either
significantly improve the profitability of a project or adversely affect any project that uses
obsolete technology. For example, the use of automatic toll  collection technology reduces
collection costs and incentives for graft. Another example is technological improvements in
customs processing,  so that border crossings  on major arterial toll roads can be traversed more
quickly ,saving  time for users and making the road more valuable.
Traffic and Revenue  Risks
Unlike project  financing in  other sectors, take-or-pay or  fixed-price contracts are
typically not available in transport, so that demand risk is a major issue in virtually all projects.
Even when there is a reasonable level of confidence  in forecasts, demand can be dramatically
affected by  competition form  other  modes  or  facilities,  changing  usage  patterns,  and
rnacroeconomic  conditions. These interrelated  issues, over which the project sponsor often has
little or no control, are very difficult to predict and represent a major risk to financing. In
particular, forecasting during the early years can be quite subjective. To the extent that these
risk are driven by economic conditions,  there is a potential role for the government to play in
risk-sharing, either through traffic or revenue guarantees or other forms of support. (These are
discussed in more detail below.)
But demand uncertainty  must be viewed with a steely-eyed  perspective.  Over-optimism
is common for privatization teams focusing on convincing private operators of the value of
their business and for potential operators who want to get the deal, convinced that they can
renegotiate almost anything once they have taken over the business. To see this, take the case
of toll roads. Traffic volumes are very sensitive to income and economic  growth and the failure
to recognize this may be one of the main reasons why so many toll road projects have failed or
ended in bitter renegotiations. Motorization and vehicle-kilometerss  traveled tend to increase
faster than income levels. This high income elasticity, especially for leisure trips, makes toll
roads especially sensitive to macroeconomic  conditions. For roads that serve export activities,
exchange rate changes can dramatically affect trade, leading to  major changes in  demand
patterns. Many toll road projects in the last decade have dramatically overestimated traffic
levels. In some of the Mexican road concessions,  traffic volumes were only one-fifth forecast
levels. In Hungary, the Ml Motorway attracted only 50 percent of expected volume in its first
year of operation. The Dulles Greenway, outside  of Washington, only attracted one-third of its
expected daily volume. Even after a toll reduction  of forty percent, the Greenway still was only
able to achieve  two-thirds of its originally forecast  volume.11
Financial  Risks: Interest  Rates
Financial risk is the risk that project cash flows might be insufficient to cover debt
service and then to pay an adequate return on sponsor equity. Financing constraints,  especially
the lack of long-term debt capital, are a significant hindrance to toll road development. Since
the advent of financial crises in emerging markets, few projects are able to generate  returns on
investment sufficient to attract private capital. This suggests that until macroeconomic risk
premiums decline and traffic growth is more established,  only a limited set of projects will be
undertaken without substantial government support. The financial crises will force many
programs to slow down and force debt restructuring  of many of the existing concessions.  There
is a need to promote more secure  financing structures  to reduce the risk of potential  bailouts.
Because toll roads are long-lived investments with high start-up costs, countries with
local capital markets that are capable of providing  long-term financing have many advantages.
Of particular importance is the available maturity of domestic finance. In many countries, new
toll concessions have been unable to obtain financing longer than 5 to 6 years, creating a major
refinancing risk that either renders the project nonviable or requires government guarantee  of
such a rollover.
In theory, financial risk is best borne by the private sector, but in transport  projects there
is likely to be substantial government  risk sharing either through revenue or debt guarantees, or
participation  by state or multilateral  development  institutions.  There also may be cash grants or
other financial contributions  that serve to improve  the project rate of return on private finance.
Currency Risk
The main currency risk  is driven by the impact on the value  of the business of
fluctuations in  the  exchange rate. In  addition, the toll  concession can  be  subject to  a
convertibility risk which refers to  the possibility that the operator may not be allowed to
exchange local for foreign currency. These are major issues for some projects, where revenues
are commonly in local currency and adjustments  for inflation and exchange rates may lag or
encounter political opposition.  Projects  can reduce  this risk by tapping domestic capital markets
where possible. Most projects attempt to mitigate exchange risk by provisions for indexing  to
inflation, although in practice  the magnitude  of exchange  volatility has made such requirements
difficult to enforce.
Force Majeure Risk
Force majeure refers to risks beyond the control of either the public or private partner,
such as floods or earthquakes, which impair the project's ability to earn revenues. While some
private insurance is becoming available for catastrophic risks, the public sector generally is
faced with the need to restructure the project should such disasters occur. This may take the
form of extending the concession  term, or to provide additional financial support. The rule is
that remedies in the event of force majeure risks should be stated in the contracts; for example
cash  compensation or  an  extension of  the  concession term  equal  to  the  length of  the
disturbance.
Regulatory and Legal Risks
Regulatory risk stems from the weak implementation  of regulatory commitments  built
into concession  contracts but also in laws or other legal instruments  relevant to the value of the
transaction. The  question asked  is whether the  regulator will  exercise its  authority and12
responsibilities over prices, public obligations, competition rules and similar rules that are
specified in the contracts and that influence  the value of the business. The solution is to try to
make sure that regulators have rules to follow and that they are independent  enough to be able
to enforce them.
But even if regulatory rules are clear enough, they are only as effective as the regulators
can be. The best designed regulatory environment  is useless if the regulator is not independent
or fair. This risk is more common  than it appears and pressures  on regulators are a major source
of concern which investors reflect in their required rate of return. In 1999, a major factor in the
restructuring of Mexico's toll road program was the pressure on regulators to cut tolls. In
Thailand, a similar concern resulted in decision by the government to cut by 50 percent a toll
level it had committed to in a BOT contract. The outcome was that the government ended up
taking over the facility.
Project finance structures typically cover periods of ten years or more. The relevant
legal and regulatory environment is likely to change substantially over that period. The rules
dealing with the financial consequences of these changes between government, users and
operators  are critical and yet often forgotten.  The rules must cover the possibility of adaptation
of the contract  terms during the tenor of the project financing.
Political Risk
Political risk concerns government actions that affect the ability to generate earnings.
These could include actions terminating the concession;  imposition of taxes or regulations that
severely reduce the value to investors; restrictions on the ability to collect or raise tariffs as
specified in the concession  agreement;  precluding contract  disputes to be resolved  in reasonable
ways. Governments generally agree to compensate investors for political risks, although in
practice  justifications for government actions may be cited to delay or prevent such payments.
Thus, private investors generally assume the risks associated with dispute resolution and the
ability to obtain compensation should the government violate the concession agreement. The
issue of meeting financial obligations while disputes are resolved may be achieved through a
requirement  of debt service reserves, escrow, or standby financing.
The credibility of the government  to uphold contractual obligations and the willingness
and ability to provide compensation  for political risks are key issues for project finance. Issue
of delays or denials of tariff increases have made many prospective parties wary of entering
into new projects. This is especially true for foreign capital, which is perceived as especially
vulnerable to political risks. Some of the more risky emerging markets may require support
from multilateral or bilateral financial institutions to reduce this risk exposure. In addition,
political  risk  insurance may  also  help  manage  issues of  inconvertibility, transfer,  and
confiscation.
Main Participants  and Their  Roles in Project Finance
Project finance involves a large number of participants, each with important roles to
play. A typical organizational  structure  is shown in Figure 1. The interests of the major parties
are discussed below.13
Figure 1: Standard  organizational  structure
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It normally will be the government that perceives the need for an infrastructure  project
and determines  whether it is suitable for project financing. This, of course, will depend partly
on the political and economic situation facing the country, as well as the characteristics  of the
project itself. It  might be  necessary to  enact specific legislation, or  even to  change the
constitution,  to enable the financing to proceed. (Many national constitutions prohibit private
ownership  or control of essential public facilities.) In addition, since project finance is critically
dependent on contractual  obligations between many parties to the deal, it might be necessary  to
enact legislation specific to the project or sector. It also may require clarifying laws relating  to
the recognition and enforcement of contractual obligations and security rights, or the laws
relating to nationalization, expropriation, and arbitration. The regulatory regime within which
the project is to function should also be clearly defined.
The public sector typically is interested in obtaining needed infrastructure  or services  at
reasonable cost and with attention to social aspects. This will almost inevitably involve the
government making comparisons with the economics of the project using public funds. While
in many cases public sector borrowing costs will be lower, other factors should be considered,
including the opportunity cost of public funds and foreign exchange and the efficiency and
expertise  the private sector might bring to the project.14
The Concessionaire
The project sponsors normally will form a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to act as the
concessionaire. The precise form of this entity will depend on the circumstances, taking into
account the fiscal, accounting, and legal treatment of the SPV vis-a-vis the parent equity
sponsors. The relationship  between the sponsors  needs to be clearly defined and will usually be
set out in a shareholders' agreement. The SPV might have other equity investors, such as
development finance institutions or the government. The SPV will be  capitalized by  the
sponsors in agreed proportions, normally on the terms set out in an agreement that deals not
only with the sponsors' initial capital investments but also with any further obligations with
respect to  future contribution obligations."  In addition, rules need to  be  established with
respect to how the SPV is to be administered,  how it is to be financed, how sponsors share
profits, and how, if at all, sponsors may transfer or sell their shareholdings  or interests in the
SPV. This aspect has become increasingly  important,  as the need for a larger equity share in the
financial structure has meant that more than one company is likely to be involved as sponsor.
The rise of such sponsor consortiums  is potentially difficult,  as construction company investors
may have shorter time horizons than longer-term  strategic  or operating equity investors.
Lending Banks
Most project finance funding to date has been in the form of commercial debt. The
percentage of the anticipated  project cost that commercial  banks will be prepared to lend will
vary depending on such issues as the size and sector of the project, the projections and sources
of project revenues, and the banks' evaluation of the other risks of the project. The banks
usually lend directly  to the SPV (concessionaire).
The banks will be expected to finance the project on a  non-recourse or  a  limited
recourse  basis, emphasizing  project revenues  as the primary source of repayment  of interest and
principal. In return for agreeing to finance the project on such a basis, the banks are likely to
require the ability to exercise a considerable  degree of control over the SPV and its activities,
and to have "step-in rights" should any one of a large number of triggering default events
occur.
Other Lenders
The SPV might also be able to borrow from other sources, particularly national and
regional  development banks, bilateral agencies, export credit  agencies, and  development
finance institutions. In particular, multilateral financial institutions have played an expanding
role,  not  only  in  terms of  financing and technical assistance, but  also  in  terms  of  risk
management and insurance instruments that have almost become prerequisites for private
financing.  It also may be possible to utilize leasing activity  to lower after-tax costs of financing.
Other Parties to the Project Contracts
As the SPV is usually only a legal construct, it needs to ensure that it performs its
obligations under the  concession agreement by  sub-contracting those obligations to  third
parties. The principal parties usually are the construction  contractor and the operator of project
facilities. It is common for one or both of these parties to be part of the sponsor consortium, or
an affiliate of the sponsors.
1 These may be supported by guarantees of parent or affiliated  companies  of the sponsors.15
The SPV also will need to insure that it has adequate  supply contracts for raw materials
and linked services. For example, airport concessions  require contracting with air navigation
authorities for air traffic control services. In some cases, the project will require agreements
with external  parties for project outputs, such as the use of ports by shippers.
Where Does the Money Come From?  Types and Sources  of Project Finance  Funding
There are a number of different potential sources of funding for project financing, each
with different positions, stakes, and incentives that influence the project outcomes. Some of
these sources may only be available at different stages in the life cycle of the project. These
sources include the following:
*  equity
*  mezzanine  finance
*  commercial  lending
*  bond finance
*  project leasing
*  development  finance institutions
D  export credits, finance, or guarantees  provided  by bilateral export  credit agencies
*  derivative  products, including securitization
Equity
The principal equity investors in project finance will be.  the sponsors, although several
other parties might contribute equity to the  SPV - for  example, the  government, some
institutional investors, and in some cases, the general public through share offerings. 12 Equity
is the lowest ranking form of capital because the claims of the equity investors will rank
behind creditors of the SPV. In addition, as a matter of contract, the lenders to the project are
likely to restrict the amount and timing of dividends  and other distributions  to equity holders.
The equity investors, therefore, bear the greatest  risk of loss if the project is unsuccessful,  and
will therefore seek a much higher rate of return from the project than, for example,  holders of
senior debt. On the positive side, the equity holders gain disproportionately if the project
performs better than expected.' 3 It should also be noted that if the project assets revert to the
government at the  end of concession term, then increased investment brings no inherent
benefit to equity; sponsors gain only if project revenues  and profits are increased as a result.
Although project finance is supposed  to be organizationally  distinct form parent equity
holders, in practice not all equity is created equal! In the initial stages, sponsors are likely to
fund  their  equity  contribution either  internally or  from  on-balance sheet  borrowings.
Governments  should be careful to monitor  the sources  of this initial investment.  In some cases,
while the project equity appeared sound, the additional borrowing by the sponsor's parent
12 Different forms of investment other than straight  equity might be considered as "pseudo-equity".  For example,
in the UK, project sponsors will commonly consider lending debt to the SPV that is subordinated  to all other
borrowings. This might be  considered as  an altemative to  additional equity, and is normally based on tax
considerations  and standing in bankruptcy  should  the concession  fail.
13 In some cases, the concession contract will impose a maximum allowed return on equity, or a gain-sharing
mechanism  beyond a certain level of return.16
company so weakened the overall company  that bankruptcy  of the parent impaired  the ability to
undertake the specific project obligations.
Another issue that has changed over time is the expectation that amounts invested by
sponsors (especially by construction companies) will be at least partly matched by the profits
that the sponsors expect to derive from the associated contracts for work on the project. This
creates an incentive to overstate contract costs, especially if such work is done on a cost-plus
basis with a pre-set profit margin. In some cases, such as Mexican toll roads, construction
company sponsors were permitted to count such profits as their initial equity contribution.  This
"in-kind" equity, unfortunately,  does not bear risk or provide financial support in the same way
that cash investment  does.
However, in  the wake  of the  financial crises in  emerging markets, the  required
percentage of risk-bearing equity capital generally has risen,  so that  construction profits
typically are not enough to cover required capital contributions. This has led to demands for
more cash backed by parent equity, and by expanded efforts to construct sponsor consortiums
that may include operators, strategic investors who are likely involved in the business, and
perhaps the government itself. The net result is that equity holders can no longer look solely to
short-term construction  profits to generate their required returns;  there is a need for an ongoing
stream of residual revenues over the life of the project. This development  is a healthy one, as it
aligns the incentives  of sponsors  more with those of long-term lenders.
The proportion of a project's anticipated  funding needs which come from equity will
vary from project to project. Considerations  specific to each transport sector are discussed later
in this chapter, as are risk factors and their allocation and mitigation. In general, the amount of
equity will depending on:
*  Project economics:  The greater the revenue or commercial risks, the lenders will require
sponsors to  contribute a  higher percentage of project funding. For example, capacity
expansion of an existing toll road with a long traffic and revenue history will likely be see
as less risky by creditors  and will thus enable more leverage in the project finance structure.
•  Required  Return  (Cost)  of Equity:  The higher the  required  level of return  on  the  equity
share of the project, the higher the overall project cost. A government  may seek a balance
between higher financing costs with more equity or  greater financial risk  but  lower
potential financing costs if more debt is used. Beware,  though - too often the appeal of up-
front financial savings through use of more leverage or short-term debt has been irresistible
to politicians, especially  nearing elections.  This has led to project failures where early cash
flows were unable to sustain debt coverage - but by then it was someone else's problem.
The lesson is that all structured financings have both project risk and financial risk. The
skill is in balancing the two, so that as project returns become more secure over time,
additional debt financing  might be incurred.  Note that this is just the opposite of what often
occurs in practice, where highest debt levels often occur during the early stages of the
investment, when project risks (especially demand risks) are greatest. Once a project is in
operation and has a track record, the SPV, its sponsors,  creditors, and the government may
want to reconsider  the structure of financing.
*  Country risk: Concerns about institutional and macrofinancial  matters often lead to lenders
requiring  greater equity investment.17
*  Government and legal requirements:  Accounting standards and laws may restrict the types
of sponsors and the nature of equity contributions. For example, special treatment may be
required for local control if foreign sponsor equity is to be used (for example, a golden
share). The amount and nature of equity also will depend on the degree to which recourse is
permitted to the parent company with respect to third party creditors (suppliers, contractors)
if payment is not made by the SPV. The host government also might require a minimum
level of equity as a precondition  for the concession and might require investment by parties
other than the sponsor.
One of the  key requirements of sponsors is to  limit (to  the extent possible) their
prospective financial exposure to an underperforming project. This absence of a "big balance
sheet" or "deep pockets" to support the project on the downside forces the lenders to assume a
part of project risks. This is what makes project finance different, and why issues related to the
structuring of debt are critical. In fact, much of the drop-off in project finance activity since
1997 has occurred because project arrangers have not been able to structure debt packages that
provided enough security without charging interest rates that are so high that the project is no
longer viable.
Mezzanine Finance
Mezzanine finance falls somewhere  between senior debt and equity. Examples include
subordinated  debt and preference shares. Payments are made to these investors only after senior
debt is serviced and will only be made if certain conditions are satisfied, such as minimum
coverage ratios or investment requirements  related to the performance  of the project. The risks
taken by mezzanine providers are greater than those of senior creditors, and so required returns
will be higher (but  lower than those required by traditional equity investors). This higher
expected return might be provided  by a higher interest rate; a stated preferred dividend rate; or
ways to share in the profits, such as share options or warrants.
Mezzanine capital might be provided by certain investment trusts, mutual funds, or
insurance companies. The benefit to the sponsors is that the amount of equity required is likely
to  be  reduced. Lenders of  senior debt  should also  welcome the  addition  of  mezzanine
investment.
Commercial Lending
Given the long term nature of investments, project finance generally seeks committed
term loans with a structured repayment  profile. Revolving credits - where funds are drawn and
outstanding for  short periods  before being repaid - may be  unsuitable  given that many
infrastructure projects take a while to begin to generate cash flows large enough to service debt
interest, let alone principal repayment.
In some cases, construction financing is provided on a short-term bridge loan basis.
Once the project is completed, these bridge loans are to be refinanced with longer-term  debt.
Unfortunately, one of the consequences  of the recent turnoil in emerging markets has been that
long-term debt capital has not been available - the bridge financing was unable to cross the
river! In response, many projects now seek longer-term committed financing at the outset or
have sought guarantees from multilateral financial institutions that such financing would be
available when needed.18
Given the complex nature of project financing, the arranging of such syndicates is
limited to a relatively small group of commercial  banks, with (at least in theory) the ability to
analyze both the commercial  and political risks of a project. In general, the senior debt will be
syndicated to a number of commercial banks; each of the syndicate banks will be willing to
lend on the same terms and conditions. The syndicate will be subject to the same priority of
debt, sharing receipts and committing to a consensus before any terms of the borrowing are
changed.
At the construction stage of the project, revenues may be unavailable to service debt.
The relationship  between the drawdown  of debt versus the drawdown  of equity or other capital
will be negotiated at the outset and will be contained in the "term sheet" of the commercial
loan. This drawdown of debt results in an liability comprised of both principal and accrued
interest.
Debt is usually at its highest level on handover of the project to the SPV, and includes
interest capitalized during construction  phase. The profile of debt service and loan repayments
should follow the expected trend of revenues; this often requires project sponsors to forego
dividends in the early years of operation.
Commercial lenders typically see themselves as only medium-term creditors, usually
expecting to be repaid between three and seven years from the beginning of operations. The
number of projects that are capable of paying back debt in this period is quite limited, thus
requiring either refinancing or rollovers to longer maturities. In practice, this has been quite
difficult, as local banks in emerging markets may not be able to handle such amounts. On the
other hand, long-term risks of currency depreciation and limited hedging opportunities make it
unattractive for  international banks to  lend, despite  higher interest  rates.  This  is  why
macrofinancial  risks are so damaging  to the market for project finance.
Because commercial banks fund themselves by raising short-term funds at a floating
interest rate, they are not in a position to lend long-term funds at a fixed rate without hedging
their interest rate exposure. But the potential for hedging is  limited in  many developing
countries, and availability of hedging reduces with lengthening maturities in any case. As a
result, commercial  debt tends to be floating  rate of medium term.
Bond Finance
As a major source of general corporate finance, it is perhaps surprising that only a very
small proportion of project finance is funded through capital markets, especially when you
consider the pricing, maturity and flexibility inherent with Eurobonds or domestic bonds.
However, some features of bonds are not amenable to project finance structures, although
increasing  sophistication  in techniques and instruments  and the growth of institutional  investors
seeking longer term, higher-yield  returns may spur use of bonds in project finance. Given the
problems of floating rates and medium terms of commercial  debt, such development  might well
be the single most important  factor in the expansion  of project finance opportunities.
Bonds typically are of longer maturity and carry fixed rates. They also contain fewer
restrictive covenants. The Eurobond markets tends to be deeper, with a broader investor base
than commercial debt finance. Because Eurobonds contain many standardized features, they
tend to be negotiated  more quickly and thus reach financial close faster.19
Unfortunately, the  more flexible covenants and  standardization result form having
recourse  to the borrowing entity - the very aspect that makes  project finance unique. Thus, the
development of project bonds will require different approaches to  covenants and liability,
making them more like commercial  loans.
Bond finance has other potential disadvantages  in a project structure. The single up-
front  subscription limits  the  ability to  draw down funds  as  needed, thereby increasing
capitalized  interest charges.1 4 The lack of a lead bank may reduce the ability of the sponsor to
obtain waivers for  project changes. Disclosure requirements are greater, and  interest rate
volatility means that markets change dramatically  shut down for all but the most creditworthy
borrowers at times. 15
The traditional bond structure does not provide any mechanism for flexibility in the
monitoring and control of the project. This presents a problem, as the ability to  react to
changing circumstances affecting the project is an integral part of successful project finance.
Sponsors require a central point of contact with creditors  a role played by the lead commercial
banks but not assumed by the trustee of a bond issue (they have different legal standing and
exposure.)' 6 Also, unlike many commercial lenders with long experience in project finance,
most bond investors lack sectoral or country expertise to be an active participant. Although a
number of project bond issues have been completed without specifically addressing these
problems,  they have mostly been through private placements  to major institutional  buyers, such
as the US 144a market.
In order to  expand the use of bonds in project finance, insurance companies have
become more active. One approach is to have bond issues guaranteed by a monoline insurer,
who provides a financial guarantee  to investors.  The sponsor then has a central point of contact
for renegotiation, waivers, or changes. Investors  rely on the guarantee provided by the insurer.
The bondholders exposure is thus converted  primarily to the monoline insurer's balance sheet
and away from project risk. To date, these initiatives have been primarily used in developed
economies,  such as providing  credit enhancement  for an extension of the London Underground.
With the increasing interest and the introduction  of hybrid approached mixing insurance and
project risks, it is likely that the project bond market will become an entirely new asset class in
project finance.
Leasing
Leasing involves ownership  of an asset by one party who provides the right to another
party to use it for a fixed period of time in exchange for payments (rental). While accounting,
tax, and legal status vary across countries, leasing is potentially very attractive for project
finance. First, costs may be lower as tax benefits (depreciation)  to the lessor may be available
earlier than if they remained in the project company. Second, it intrudes new sources of
finance, since manufacturers  or asset-based  finance -companies  are not normally project lenders.
Third, in  countries where laws recognizing property and  security interests are not  well-
14 This is called negative  carry,  in which investment  returns on cash and liquid investments  on funds received but
not yet utilized are less than the interest rate on the bonds  themselves.
is  For example,  medium rated corporate  borrowers  in the United States have saw spreads over US Treasuries  more
than double between 1998 and 1999.
16 In some cases, the introduction  of a project  agent, acting on behalf of bondholders,  has been used. Other cases
have delegated bondholder  review of project changes to participating  commercial banks, covered under a set of
intercreditor  agreements.20
developed, there is an advantage in having the lessor retain ownership. The combination of
these features can enhance the economic  viability  of project finance.
However, leasing does add further complexity to the transaction. For example, special
agreements may be required as to what happens to  leased assets at the termination of  a
concession. A  new  set  of  agreements between lenders and  lessors are  required, since
withdrawal of the leased asset typically kills the project operation (for example, the leasing of
rolling stock in a rail concession). Finally, to the extent that leasing benefits are tax-driven,
governments  should decide whether  the specific  project finance benefits are would the broader
fiscal cost to the treasury.
Development  Finance Institutions
Development  finance institutions (DFIs) exist to foster growth in developing countries.
In this regard,  they differ from export credit agencies, which serve to promote exports from that
particular country. Most of the DFIs involved  in project finance are multilateral in nature. Their
assistance usually takes the form of non-concessionary  rate funding to conmmercially  viable
projects. There has been an increased emphasis on private sector investment over that in the
public sector. While there has always been concern  on the part of other lenders that DFIs tend
to side with sponsors or host countries,, this view is usually offset buy the political comfort,
country knowledge, and "catalytic" benefits DFIs bring to a project. The outgrowth of DFI
experience and ties in (at least some) developing countries has led to what the IFC terms "an
honest broker role". DFI involvement  may convince commercial  banks, export credit agencies,
local investors, or governments to take an interest in a project which they might not have
otherwise.17
Perhaps the prime example  of DFI activity in project finance is that of the International
Finance Corporation (IFC). IFC is part of the World Bank Group and, unlike the World Bank
itself, can only lend to private enterprises  without the direct support of a government  guarantee.
The IFC typically gets involved in projects through commercial loans, although it also may
take  equity  positions.  IFC  lending  tends  to  have  higher  disclosure and  transparency
requirements  than traditional commercial  loans. On occasion, it also provides loans with longer
maturities  than would be available form other lenders.
Export Credit  Agencies and Political Risk Insurance
An export credit agency (ECA) protects exporters and their financiers against default,
whether from commercial  or political causes. It is limited to exports from the specific country.
While terms vary across countries,  ECA cover  can be provided  to insure against matters such as
political risks, expropriation,  major regulatory changes, exchange controls, war and political
violence.
Other  Providers of Political Risk Insurance
The most well-known of the DFIs offering political risk cover is the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee  Agency (MIGA). Importantly,  MIGA coverage is available to some 135
countries. MIGA can cover risk of war and civil disturbance, expropriation, and exchange
transfer  restrictions. Coverage  is long term, and can apply to both debt and equity investments.
17 In some cases, it is felt that the DFI might be able to exercise a degree of influence over the decisions of the
government with  respect to macroeconomic  matters.21
Where MIGA cover has been used, the financing is more attractive to commercial banks in
terms of risk allocation.
The World Bank also offers political risk cover under its "partial guarantee programn"
and is particularly relevant to financing of infrastructure  projects. The partial risk guarantee
covers non-performance  by the host government  of contractual obligations that are part of the
project. This scope of the guarantee  varies, but can include such matters as an agreed regulatory
framework; the supply of land or other raw materials; the performance  of offtake obligations;
and compensating  for delays caused by government  inaction  or political events.
A number of private insurance companies have begun to offer political risk cover.
Historically,  though, such cover has only be available to select countries, for limited duration,
and in relatively small amounts.
Derivative  Products
Derivatives are financial contracts the value of which depends on an underlying asset.
The use of derivatives in project finance applies to four main areas. First, project cash flows
may move independently of or opposite to interest rates, resulting in interest rate exposure if
the project is funded on a floating  rate basis.
Second, some projects tend to produce local currency revenues,  while financing may be
denominated  in foreign currency,  thereby introducing  exchange rate risk. Third, raw materials
or finished  outputs that have significant  price volatility  may be involved in the project.'8
The Role of the Public Sector  in Project Finance
There are two main reasons for government  to commit to support for project financing:
(i) to offset the financial or exchange risks by reducing capital expenditures or to improve
revenues to the extent necessary for a project to cover debt service and provide a reasonable
equity return; (ii) to offset the demand and traffic risk and protect investors (especially lenders)
from the risk that actual cash flows will fall below expected cash flows and thus be inadequate
to cover debt service. When unexpected events arise and a renegotiation of a contract arises,
these two are often the main problems a regulator must address. The name of the game is to
come up with a mix of government actions that ensures that an acceptable financial return can
be generated. These actions may include some redesign of the financing schemes to include
guarantees  but also of the project design, including  its duration.
Instruments  for Public Participation  in Project Finance
If public financial support is appropriate, a variety of mechanisms can be used. to support
private financing. The instruments  range from revenue enhancements  to equity guarantees.
*  Equity guarantees. They provide a concessionaire  an option to be bought out by the
government  at a price that guarantees a minimum return on equity. Although the liability is
contingent, the government in effect assumes project risk and corresponding  private sector
incentives  are reduced.
*  Debt guarantees. These guarantee  that the govermment  will pay any shortfall related to
principal and interest payments.  The government  may also guarantee any refinancing  that is
l  This  need  not be on a direct  basis.  For example,  a port  which  predominantly  serves  chemical  industries  will be
affected  by  the  price  of  both  raw  materials  and  finished  goods.22
scheduled.  It creates significant  govermnent  exposure and reduces  private sector incentives,
although it may decrease  the cost or increase  the amount of debt available to the project.
*  Exchange rate guarantees. With an exchange rate guarantee,  the government agrees to
compensate  the concessionaire  for increases  in financing costs due to exchange rate effects
on foreign financing. Exchange rate guarantees expose the government to significant risk,
as well as increasing  the incentive  to utilize foreign capital.
*  Grants/subsidies. Equity and debt guarantees all create contingent liabilities for the
government. Alternatively,  governments  can furnish grants or subordinated  loans at project
inception,  buying down the size of the project that needs private finance. (In Chile, the size
of the government grant was one of the criteria  used in awarding  the South Access toll road
concession.) Alternatively, explicit subsidies can be  given as part of the renegotiation
process. In Argentina, this subsidy  took the form of a forgiveness  of accumulated  payments
due to the government for the right to operate the concession. In general, these grants or
subsidies  have no provision for repayment.
*  Subordinated  loans Subordinated  loans can fill a gap in the financing structure between
senior debt and equity. From the governmenfs perspective, they also have the attractive
feature that they can be repaid with a return if the road is successful. Subordinated  loans
improve feasibility by increasing the debt service coverage ratio on senior debt, and by
reducing the need for private equity, which requires a higher return. However, because
subordinated  debt does eventually  require repayment,  it does not improve project feasibility
to  the  same degree as  a  similarly sized grant. Another alternative would be  for the
government to contribute financing that has characteristics of both debt and equity. One
such instrument would be a "reverse  convertible"  contribution  that would remain as equity
unless the project was successful, at which point it would convert to debt for repayment.
An alternative for the regulator is to play with the design of the contract. This involved
playing with the revenue from toll and with the toll levels and types, with the specification
of the investment  and other service obligations  or with the duration of the contract
*  Minimum  traffic and revenue guarantees. 19 A minimum traffic or revenue guarantee,  in
which the government compensates the concessionaire  if traffic or revenue falls below a
minimum threshold, is a relatively common form of support for toll roads. Typically, the
threshold is  set  10 to  30 percent below the expected volume and it is generally more
desirable to rely on a revenue guarantee  if the goal is to facilitate the access of the operator
to  the  financial  market.. This  trigger reduces government exposure  while providing
sufficient revenue coverage to support the debt component of the capital structure. In
addition, traffic and revenue guarantees help retain financial incentives in  the project,
unless conditions deteriorate well below forecast. If government's share "downside risk"
with the private sector through guarantees, they should also consider seeking instruments
that allow profit on the "upside". One way to do this is by a revenue-sharing  arrangement in
which the government  receives a portion of revenues  above a maximum  traffic threshold.
*  Shadow  tolls. One way of providing subsidies  is through shadow  tolls. Under a shadow
toll, the government contributes a specific payment per vehicle to the concessionaire.  In
19 Note  that  in  some  countries  such  as Chile  for  instance,  minimum  income  guarantee  to protect  the  operator  are  introduced
jointly  with  revenue  sharing  scheme  which  allow  the govemment  to  share-30-50  percent-  into extra  profits  (i.e. revenue
generating  a return  in excess  of 15 percent)  when traffic is consistently  above  forecast.23
effect, it is an ongoing revenue stream from the government in lieu of an up-front grant or
loan. Because they are paid over time, they may be less of a burden on the public budget.
The drawback of shadow tolls, though, is that they may not provide investors with much
protection from revenue risks. That is,  shadow toll payments are highest when traffic
volumes are large. As  a  result, government payments may be  inadequate to  protect
investors when traffic is low and may be unnecessarily  high when traffic volumes are high.
In addition, the payment of shadow tolls over time creates a credit risk for concessionaires.
These inefficiencies can be reduced in a number of ways, such as a declining payment
schedule as volumes increase or a maximum  traffic level beyond which shadow  tolls are not
paid. Because they tend to "top off'  private revenues, shadow tolls may be particularly
valuable as support to low volumes roads that require upgrading or rehabilitation rather
than new construction.
*  Concession extensions and revenue enhancements. These types of financial support
involve limited public sector risk, but also do little to support or enhance private financing.
First, a government can extend the concession  term if revenues fall below a certain amount.
Second, a  government can restrict competition or  allow the  development of ancillary
services by the concessionaire.
- Changes in contractual obligations.  A final way generally considered by regulators is to
allow a redesign of the contractual obligations. Slower or less investments, fewer services
obligations, are all ways of cutting costs and transforming a unviable road into a viable one.
Choosing  among these Instruments
In general, the most advantageous types of support for the concessionaire are those
which provide early funding streams (when revenues  from the toll road are low or non existent
during the  construction period) and  which give guarantees for  unexpected problems (for
example, exchange rate guarantees).  This is true at the time the contract is initially signed but
also whenever  the regulator is asked to renegotiate  to restore financial  viability to a project who
may have lost  it. The least significant are those which themselves are unpredictable i.e.,
additional rights for development around the road. These various mechanisms of government
support can also be used in combination when a project is nor feasible on its own and where
revenue risk is substantial. In such cases, grant plus minimum revenue guarantees may be
sufficient to  induce private participation. Governments should avoid broad guarantees that
reduce lenders' scrutiny and due diligence. In many cases, the availability of these guarantees
induced lenders to  provide funds based on  guarantees and  sponsor strength rather than
underlying project risks and revenues.
Sources of Finance: Summing Up
The increasing sophistication  of financing techniques in project finance is expanding
the uses of derivatives as well as other areas. Many large-scale infrastructure projects now
require some form of credit enhancement  to make the project "bankable". This may involve
completion guarantees, government  guarantees in terms of traffic or revenues, and supply and
offtake agreements.
Public officials often tend to view infrastructure  project finance as having two sides -
the public sector and the private sector. But the complexity of project finance arises just as24
much from the different interests, perspectives, and incentives of the participants. There is -
and probably always will be - a sense among sponsors and governments that there is  an
undersupply of commercial  funds. There is always a significant  difference  between the project
risks sponsors believe lenders should be willing to accept and those risks lenders are willing to
accept. Throughout  negotiations,  the arrangers  of loan finance battle with sponsors over control
of the project SPV. Loan arrangers, especially after having faced "haircuts" (losses) on many
project loans in the 1990s,  will insist on substantial  controls  and monitoring of all aspects of the
project that may have financial implications. Management  and sponsors, by virtue of their
status, tend to be more naturally optimistic and entrepreneurial, and almost always find it
frustrating to deal with naturally cautious  bankers (although  the bankers would merely describe
themselves as prudent!)
Tying It All Together:  PPI, Required  Returns and the Cost of Capital
The above risk factors can be pulled together in the concept of cost of capital. This
represents the required rate of return that all investors, blended together, might expect on a
project. Algebraically,  we can write this as:
Cost of capital = (Required  rate of return on debt) x (Percentage  of debt in the  project) +
(Required  rate of return on equity)  x (Percentage  of equity in the  project)
Since interest expense typically is tax deductible, we can calculate the cost of capital
either on a before-tax or an after-tax  basis. It is important  to understand  that the tax rate that is
relevant is the one that applies to project sponsors.
We can think about the required rate of return on debt (that is, the borrowing cost) as
having a number of risk factors, each of which commands a premium that must be paid to
investors in order for them to bear that particular  risk:
Required rate of return on debt = Risk-free borrowing  rate  for specified time horizon +
Premium  for country  risk +
Premium  for currency  risk +
Premium  for project or sector risk +
Premium  for regulatory  risk
Similarly, we can think about the required rate of return on equity investment as being
equal to a risk free rate plus a premium for the higher risk faced by equity relative to debt, as
well as all four risk factors above. The equity risk premium is a function of how risky a specific
sectoral investment is relative to equity markets overall. (This adjustment factor is known as
beta.20) Thus,
Required rate of return on equity = Risk-free borrowing  rate  for specified time horizon +
Equity risk  premium (adjusted  by project beta) +
Premium  for country  risk +
Premium  for currency  risk +
7O  See I. Alexander and A. Estache, "A back-of-the-envelope  approach to assess the cost of capital for network
regulators," mineo, World Bank, December 1997.25
Premium  for project or sector risk +
Premium  for regulatory  risk
While in many cases the risk premiums required would be similar for debt and equity,
this will not always be the case. For example, regulatory lags in approving pricing decisions
may have a greater effect on equity holders, since creditors  have a prior claim.
The next step is to consider  the appropriate  mix of debt and equity. This is known as the
capital structure or the funding structure. While much theoretical work has been done on
optimal capital structures, in practice it is essential to know the capacity of the debt and equity
markets; their willingness to invest; and the levels of return required. It is important that the
funding structure is appropriate  for the deal under consideration,  as financing mix should vary
between different asset types and the size  and volatility of revenue streams.
In practice, criteria like the Debt Service Cover Ratio and Loan Life Cover Ratio,
default provisions, and debt and maintenance  reserve requirements  are all crucial in putting the
debt funding package together.
The Debt Service Cover Ratio (DSCR) is an important  measure used to determine  how
easily a project can service its scheduled repayments. The DSCR typically is calculated on a
rolling annual or semiannual  basis as:
DSCR = Cash  flow before debt service
Debt service
It is used extensively by lenders to determine how much debt can be supported by
project cash flows. The minimum DSCR required by lenders varies with each type of project.
Historically, DSCR for toll roads have been around 1.4, and for airports and ports around 1.2.
these levels have risen in the wake of the crisis in emerging markets, so that coverage ratios of
1.5 to 2.0 times debt service are not uncommon.  Since transport  project revenues typically rise
over time, lenders  will look at both a minimum and an average DSCR.
The Loan Life Cover Ratio (LLCR) is used to determine the cash flow available over
the term of the debt relative to the amount of debt outstanding.  It is defined as:
LLCR = (Present  value of cash flow before debt service)
(Present  value of debt service costs)
The discount rate used is the total interest rate applicable  to the debt. The goal is to have
the LLCR to be sufficiently  greater than 1.0 under a full range of sensitivity analyses.
While the DSCR and the LLCR provide lenders with an initial guide as to the level of
debt that a project might sustain, they also are used on an ongoing basis. They can be used to
vary the interest margin on project loans. For example, a project with a low initial DSCR or
LLCR may have its interest spread reduced as these ratios improve over the life of the project.
Both ratios also are used to set minimum requirements before distributions may be made to
equity holders. Moreover, if DSCR or LLCR decline from expectations,  lenders usually require
that equity investors leave funds in the project until acceptable ratio levels are restored. In
extreme cases, senior debt holders may require repayment  if prespecified  DSCR and LLCR are
not met, even if interest and principal payments  are being made.26
We have constructed a simple model to evaluate the effects of changing risk premiums
and guarantees on the cost of capital. Table 2 provides one estimate of how costs of capital
have changed for a typical transport  infrastructure  project.
Table  2 Effects  of Increased  Risk  on  Cost  of Capital
FROM:  TO:
Risk-free  rate  6.00%  6.00%
Debt  risk  premium  5.00%  6.00%
Project  risk  premium  1.00%  2.00%
Country  risk  premium  2.00%  4.00%
Regulatory  risk  premium-debt  1.50%  3.00%
Regulatory  risk  premium-equity  1.50%  3.00%
Equity  Risk  premium  5.50%  8.00%
Asset  beta  0.75  0.75
Debt  beta  0.00  0.00
Equity  beta  1.88  1.50
Debt  as  % Capital  60.00%  50.00%
Equity  as  % Capital  40.00%  50.00%
Marginal  tax  rate  30.00%  30.00%
Cost  of Debt  (pre-tax)  16.50%  21.00%
Cost  of Debt  (after-tax)  11.55%  14.70%
Cost  of Equity  20.81%  27.00%
Weighted  Average  Cost  of Capital  (pre-tax)  18.23%  24.00%
Weighted  Average  Cost  of  Capital  (after-tax)  15.26%  20.85%
Source:  Author estimates.
The table reflects the higher risk factors for country and currency risks, as well as
increases in  risk  premiums required by  investors  for  more  uncertainty about  transport
infrastructure  traffic levels and revenue generation capabilities.  Regulatory risk premiums have
risen as a result of being unsure whether pricing increases and adjustments for exchange rates
and inflation will be forthcoming in a timely manner. The higher equity percentage also is
shown. Overall, the events since 1997  are estimated (in a general sectoral sense) to have caused
the cost of debt to rise to as much as 15  percent (after-tax)  while costs of equity may be as high
as 27 percent. Overall, this leads to a weighted average cost of capital of 24 percent pre-tax, 21
percent after-tax. In conversations  with investment  and commercial  bankers, common rules of
thumb are that transport infrastructure  projects in 1999  might require 30 percent equity returns,
with costs of capital in the 20 percent to 22 percent range. These notions are broadly consistent
with the above crude estimates.21  Thus, recent financial market conditions might have pushed
up all-in financing costs by as 5 percent or more. We also can place this increase in monetary
terms. Suppose we have a $100 million dollar project with a 25 year life. An increase in the
cost of capital from 15 percent to 20 percent would require additional payments to investors of
just under $5 million  per year.
21 Of course, all of these will vary by project.27
The Effect of Public Participation  on the Cost of Capital in Project Finance: Guarantees
versus Equity Contributions  - or Both?
The increasingly difficult financial enviromnent  has caused transport project managers
to seek ways of mitigating or buying down these risks, so as to reduce the cost of capital for the
project and thus enhance its viability. To see this, it is useful to work through a hypothetical
example of how government  participation  affect the viability of project finance.
One mechanism  would be for the government  to participate  in the project investment  on
an equity basis. Not too  long ago, the effect of this might have been to  allow a higher
percentage of debt finance. Unfortunately,  government investment contributions are not what
they used to  be! But  with the withdrawal of  many previous sources of equity, a  direct
investment  by the government is now likely to serve as a supplement  to construction company
equity, so that the aggregate amount is sufficient  to reach the 60 percent debt/40 percent equity
standards that are now in place.
How much public sector equity investment might be required? At a minimum, one
might expect that all of the additional equity required in the capital structure might need to
come from government.  If project structures  shift from 70/30 to 60/40, this amount might be a
minimum of ten percent. For a project that requires a 50/50 structure, government might be
asked to contribute as much as 20 percent. (The "old" structures of 70/30 were done in the
private equity market, so we might assume all incremental  equity would need to come from the
public sector.)  In monetary terms, this represents  $10 to $20 million on a $100 million project.
A few other considerations  are relevant  to government  direct investment:
1.  It allows the government to participate in the "upside" if the project turns out to perform
well in the long run.
2.  It creates incentives for the government to manage regulatory affairs in a timely manner,
and less likely to adopt price constraints or limit price adjustments for political reasons.
Thus, it may serve to reduce regulatory risks.
3.  The participation of the government in the project may make it easier to re-finance when
the initial tranche of debt becomes due in 5 to  10 years. In fact, such participation  may
make slightly longer initial maturities  feasible.
4.  A lower project cost of capital may result ifthe government  requires a lower rate of return
for its equity investment  relative to private equity investors.  However, since these funds are
being used for the same project, I would argue that such differential required rates of return
are inappropriate.
Overall, then, if the government  were to participate  in the equity investment,  we might
expect the regulatory risk premium to fall by 1 percent, and the project risk premium to fall by
1 percent. If these estimates are correct, the overall cost of capital would fall from the 21
percent shown in Table 1 to just over 19 percent. This 2 percent reduction in the cost of capital
translates to just over $2 million per year on a 25-year  project. While this may make the project
more feasible, it would not provide the government with the requisite equity returns. The real
value to government investment  would be if it allowed for both a higher share of debt and a
lower required return on private equity,  but this does not appear  to be the case in current capital
market conditions. Rather, it serves to "buy down" project size to make it more attractive to
private capital.28
An alternative approach is for the government to  consider providing guarantees. In
general, these could take two forms. The first would be to  guarantee project volumes or
revenues, with appropriate  adjustments for inflation and exchange rate factors. The alternative
is to guarantee the debt service (both principal and interest, as well as possibly a guarantee of
debt refinancing at maturity). These two alternatives  are quite different in character and in cost
to the government.
Guaranteeing a minimum level of revenues serves to reduce risks to both equity and
debt investors, while debt guarantees serve primarily to reduce borrowing costs. (If project
revenues are insufficient to cover debt service, then the equity holders would receive no return
during that time period.) Debt guarantees may serve to increase the relative amount of debt that
the  private  sector would  provide, so  that  the  size of  the  equity  investment might  be
correspondingly  lowered.
The cost to the government of revenue guarantees therefore should be significantly
higher than debt guarantees. To see this, we might consider a typical toll road project in which
debt service expense is about 2/3 of net cash flows in the early years. This means that you
would need a  1/3 shortfall in revenues before the debt guarantee would activate. On a $150
million dollar toll road such as Road 5 in Peru, a 50 percent revenue shortfall might represent
guarantee "makeup"  payments of approximately  $3 million per year.
By contrast, suppose  the project generates gross revenues of about $30 million per year,
with net revenues of $21 million before financing costs. If this level was guaranteed, a  1/3
shortfall would require government  payments  of $7 million.
To  see what these effects might look like over time, I  estimated the cost  to  the
government of a $150 million dollar toll road project under the following  assumptions:
Table 3: Hypothetical  Project  Cash Flow Assumptions
Total  Initial  Investment  $150,000,000
Total  Government  Investment  $0
Total  Private  Investment  $150,000,000
Year  0 Percentage  Initial  Investment  50%
Year  1 Percentage  Initial  Investment  50%
Concession  life  (years)  30
Percentage  Debt  Financing  60.00%
Cost  of Debt  (pre-tax)  16.00%
Cost  of Equity  29.00%
Cost  of Capital  21.20%
Year  1 Cash  Flow  $30,000,000
Inflation  5.0%
Real  Growth  Rate  3.0%
Operating  & Maintenance  cost  percentage  30.0%
Suppose  that initial revenues were lower than forecast, but then grew off of this smaller
base. Also suppose that the government had guaranteed  debt service on this structure. If initial
revenues were half of forecast, the government would then have to provide supplemental
financial support for 5 years, with a initial payment of just under $4 million in the first year of29
operation and with a total present value of payments of $7 million (at a 21 percent discount
rate). On an undiscounted basis, the total supplemental  payments are estimated at just over $10
million.
In contrast, if the net cash flow stream is guaranteed to investors, a 50 percent initial
shortfall would require government payments every year, with a net present value of $78
million for this liability. Of course, such guarantees  could be structured in many ways - such as
guaranteeing a percentage of the base case forecast, or a minimum monetary amount per year.
(Guaranteeing a specific dollar amount is similar to providing a debt service guarantee.) In
general, though, with a 60 percent debt structure, revenue shortfalls would have to be about 1/3
for debt service guarantees to be activated.
Overall, the changed financial environment has implications for designing government
participation in infrastructure  concessions. Rather than direct investment being a substitute for
guarantees, it now serves to replace portfolio sources of equity. On the other hand, guarantees
are still helpful in  attracting debt capital on better terms. However, the  level of revenue
guarantees required to  generate the  much-higher expected equity returns  is  likely  to  be
extremely costly to the government. Given this environment, a  composite approach of debt
guarantees and supplemental government investment on the equity side may provide the least-
cost approach. This could be implemented  by offering debt service guarantees and then asking
prospective bidders to bid the minimum government  investment  required. 22
The Future of Project Finance in Transport
Recent developments in emerging financial markets have dramatically changed the
appetite for and terms of transport infrastructure  projects. The effects of defaults in Asia and
Russia, and the devaluations in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, have resulted in dramatic increases in
political  and  currency/exchange risk  premia. 23 Given the  large needs  for  sovereign debt
financing,  infrastructure project  finance  will  be  seeking  guarantees  at  the  same  time
governments are issuing primary securities. Large portfolio outflows in emerging market funds
mean that the sources of both equity and debt capital that became available in the mid-1990s
are drying up for all but the most creditworthy  projects.
Moreover,  any  real  economic effects from  these  financial events have  particular
consequences for the transport sector. Since transport is a derived demand, any decline in real
economic activity will be quickly felt in traffic levels and revenues. These effects vary by
sector, especially over the medium to longer term. Currency devaluations  that help spur exports
may generate  higher volumes for seaports and air cargo activity.
By  contrast, declines in  real  economic activity could be  make matters  especially
difficult for toll roads. Auto ownership rates are very sensitive to taxes and tariffs, both of
which are likely to come under pressure for budgetary reasons. 24 In addition, trip generation is
highly income sensitive. Declines in economic  activity tend have large effects on auto traffic on
toll roads, as drivers shift to free alternatives and also reduce the number of trips taken.
22 This approach  was considered by Peru's Special Committee on Toll Roads in December 1998.
23  Oxford Analytica (December 1998)  reports that spreads for sovereign debt over ten year US Treasuries  reached
900-1400 basis points in September  before abating prior to Brazil devaluation  in January 1999.
24  The IMF is forecasting large regional current account deficits for Latin America, which increase pressures to
reduce import volumes through tariffs and taxes.30
What does all this mean for project finance in transport?
1.  Risks have increased.
Premia for regulatory, political, and currency  risk all have risen. Country risk premiums
in emerging markets, which by early 1997 had fallen to 3 percent to 5 percent above
comparable maturity U.S. Treasury securities, have risen to spreads of 7 percent to 10
percent or more. Since these factors influence  the expectations  about economic activity,
infrastructure investments that are driven by future expected growth will be cynically
received  by financial  markets.
2.  Higher costs of debt finance.
Conditions of shrinking reserves, potential devaluations,  and fiscal difficulties indicate
that sovereign debt spreads will continue to be high. Infrastructure  projects that have
significant commercial risk will face ever higher interest rates, with debt premia for
political, currency, regulatory, and sectoral risks. Depending on the particular project,
rates of LIBOR plus 6 to  10 percent should not be unexpected and thus should be
incorporated into simulation models. In addition, widely used performance indicators
such as Debt Service Cover Ratios have been adjusted, so that previous standards such
as coverage of 1.5 times interest  payments  now are commonly  2.0 times or even higher.
Future conditions in financial markets may even be worse in the short-term. All of the
above risk factors have been built upon risk-free US Treasury interest rates that are
extremely low by historical standards, especially in the medium and long-term yields.
Should expected inflation or real rates rise in the United States, the baseline for all of
the above adjustments would move up accordingly.  Moreover, any such increase in US
interest rates would probably have a negative effect on US equity markets and those
worldwide.
3.  Available tenor of debt instruments  has shortened.
Inflation and stability concerns have shortened  many lenders' horizons to 5 to 7 years,
compared to  8  to  10 years  in  recent years.  This  is  a  major problem for  many
infrastructure  projects. Even with construction  grace periods, many projects take 3 to 5
years to reach volumes that are self-supporting.  These shorter tenors would require
balloon refinancing  take place before  projects have reached enough stability in demand
patterns.
4.  Higher levels of equity are required for projects.
Projects that were being structured with 70 percent debt, 30 percent equity are now
being discussed at a minimum of 60 percent debt, 40 percent equity. In fact, recent
discussions with investment bankers indicate that governments should not be surprised
to see lenders  unwilling to finance more  than 50 percent of many projects.
5.  Sources and availability  of equity  finance have changed.
The rapid outflows from emerging market funds and developing infrastructure funds
have reduced the  ability of  sponsors to  tap them as  equity sources. As  a  result,
infrastructure projects have tried (once again) to  look primarily to construction and
engineering companies as sources of equity. However, the incentive for these parties
was to  earn enough profits on the construction activity to justify the upfront equity31
investment required. When projects were being financed with 70 percent debt, sharing
in the 30 percent equity component could be justified, especially when in most cases
construction companies put in about half the equity. However, with 40 percent to 50
percent equity required, construction profits are not  adequate to  earn a  minimally
required return. In fact, the higher required rates of return on debt mean that even if the
old capital structure  mix could be maintained,  construction  company equity holders will
now require an ongoing revenue stream to make such projects meet hurdle rates.
In short, the drying up of alternative sources of equity, combined with higher required
equity finance shares, means that substitution  of construction equity for portfolio equity
will not suffice. As a result, there will be increasing pressure for governments  to make
become involved as equity holders in these projects.
6.  Project  finance  efforts  in  transport have  shifted from  new  projects  to  the
privatization,  rehabilitation,  and expansion  of existing facilities.
The established track records of many facilities lower perceived  risks and also provide a
revenue stream from the outset to cover capacity additions. One variant of this trend is
that efforts to bundle transport projects into "packages" for both revenue diversification
and to  obtain cash flows from a  portfolio to  fund specific investments within the
package of facilities. Whether these efforts will be successful remains unclear - some
package proposals have been successful in  early stages,  such as  Mexico's  airport
concessions. However, the longer-term  consequences of these cross-subsidy structures
remain uncertain.
7.  The emergence  of a "superclass" of sponsors,  bankers, and investors.
In transport, just as in other public utilities, a "superclass" of about fifteen to twenty
project players has emerged. This group is characterized  by large size and large capacity
to  invest;  (relatively) low  cost of  capital with  deep access to  financial markets;
sophisticated development skills;  and  strong  financial support  from  their  parent
companies. Membership in this group varies by sector; for example, airport strategic
investors;  rail  investors; transport  infrastructure investment banks.  This  is  an
increasingly multinational club. While local investors and others may participate in
specific  niches, these  major  organizations increasingly have  come  to  define the
acceptable standards and de facto practices in transport project finance. This status is
evident in their global presence and repeated successes in winning both competitive  and
noncompetitive  mandates.
8.  Will experience  turn into wisdom?
Oscar Wilde wrote, "Experience is the name everyone gives to  their mistakes." In
project finance, much experience has been gained in the past decade. Many of the
lessons were there all along - sound project economics, conservative  financial structure,
comprehensive  sensitivity analysis; the effects of macroeconomic  factors; the need for
proper incentives and sound institutional and regulatory arrangements. Many of the
project finance deals in the 1990s should not have been done. The reaction to these
failures was sharp and has persisted. As emerging markets recover and project finance
activity resumes, the need is to take advantage of new roles, new instruments and
acquired knowledge  to build more sustainable  project finance.Policy Research Working Paper  Series
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